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GENDER BIAS, COGNITION, AND POWER IN THE
LEGAL ACADEMY*
Elizabeth M. Schneider'
Professor Virginia Valian's book WHY So SLOW?' has
tremendous significance for lawyers and lawmaking generally.
However, in this commentary I want to briefly focus on the
implications of her work for issues of gender bias in the legal
academy. Since I have been active in a number of
organizations concerned with problems of gender bias in legal
education, and recently chaired a Workshop for Women in
Legal Education for the Association of American Law Schools
("AALS") with the title "Getting Unstuck... Without Coming
Unglued," I have been thinking a lot about the particular
2
problems of gender bias facing women legal academics. The
"gender schemas" that Professor Valian discusses-the implicit
or unconscious hypotheses about sex differences that play a
central role in shaping men's and women's professional
lives-and the notion of accumulated disadvantage that she
explores, have a deep and complex impact on women's lives in
the academy, and in the legal academy particularly. I also
raise questions about the role of cognition for lawmaking and
proof of discrimination that are suggested by her work.
In March of 1999, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology released its Study on the Status of Women Faculty
in Science. This report made the front page of the New York
01999 Elizabeth M. Schneider. All Rights Reserved.
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Times under the heading, "MIT Admits Discrimination Against
Female Professors."3 The conclusions of this study were that
there was widespread discrimination-not intentional, perhaps,
but the result of unconscious assumptions. Numbers of tenured
women in the various departments of Science had remained
the same for many years, leadership positions were largely
male, resources and "space" for laboratories were
disproportionately given to men. The study identified subtle
factors and received considerable media attention. An editorial
in the New York Times noted that the Committee, which wrote
this report, concluded that "old-fashioned assumptions and
gender stereotyping worked to marginalize the women,
undervalue their achievements and exclude them from
positions of power, even when there seemed to be no ill
intentions."4 Nancy Hopkins, the MIT Professor of Biology who
chaired the report, has gotten faxes and e-mails from women
academics around the world confirming her findings.5
From the perspective of cognition, one of the most
interesting aspects of the report was the women faculty
members' own description of how it happened-how the women
came to know, and to realize, what was going on. The
Introduction to the Study describes it in the following way:
In the summer of 1994, three tenured women faculty in the
School of Science began to discuss the quality of their professional
lives at MIT. In the course of their careers, these women had come
to realize that gender had probably caused their professional lives to
differ significantly from that of their male colleagues. Interestingly,
they had never discussed the issue with one another and they were
even uncertain whether their experiences were unique, their
perceptions accurate. This situation was about to change
dramatically. It was soon clear to the women that their experiences
formed a pattern.6

s See A Study on the Status of Women Faculty in Science at MIT (Oct. 16,

1999) <http://web.mit.edu/fnlIwomen/women.pdf> [hereinafter A Study on the Status
of Women Faculty]; Carey Goldberg, MIT Admits Discrimination Against Female

Professors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1999, at 5.
Editorial, Gender Bias on the Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, at 16.
See Ann Douglas, Crashing the Top: Women at Elite Universities May Have
Broken the Ivory Ceiling, But They're Still Battling Old-Fashioned Discrimination

(Oct. 11, 1999) <http'//www.salon.com/books/it/1999/10/ll/douglas/index.html>.
' A Study on the Status of Women Faculty, supra note 3, at 5.
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These women polled other tenured women on the Science faculty, and 16 of the 17 women on the Science faculty sent a
proposal to the Dean asking him to establish the Committee.
In their request they wrote:
We believe that unequal treatment of women faculty impairs their
ability to perform as educators, leaders in research, and models for
women students ....

Most discrimination at MIT, whether practiced by men or
...

women, is largely unconscious. Often it is difficult to establish discrimination as a factor because any case, no matter how disturbing
or aberrant, can usually be ascribed to its special circumstances."

Amazingly, in response to their request, the Dean undertook a
quick study of his own and realized that a serious problem
existed. He became a strong champion of the women's cause
and won the approval of the administration to allow the women to establish their committee.8
The process of this Committee described in the Study is
fascinating: inclusive, scrupulous in its reliance on women's
stories of their experiences, fully participatory, and operating
by consensus. The Study documented the women faculty's
perceptions of their status that most of the senior women faculty were "invisible," excluded from a voice in their depart9
ments and from positions of any real power. This process of
"marginalization" had occurred as the women progressed
through their careers at MIT, making their jobs increasingly
difficult and less satisfying. Junior women felt more included
and supported in their departments but were concerned with
the extraordinary difficulty of combining family and work. An
important finding of the Study was that the difference between
the perception of junior and senior women faculty about the
impact of gender on their careers repeated itself over generations.' Each generation of young women, including those who
are currently senior faculty, began by believing that gender
discrimination was '"solved" in the previous generation and
would not touch them. Gradually, though, their eyes were
opened by the realization that the playing field is not level
' A Study on the Status of Women Faculty, supra note 3, at 6 (first omission
in original).
See A Study on the Status of Women Faculty, supra note 3, at 5.
3, at 8.
'A Study on the Status of Women Faculty, supra note note
3, at 7.
10 See A Study on the Status of Women Faculty, supra

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: 4

after all; that the slight disadvantages accumulated over time
had created great differences between their careers and those
of their male colleagues; and that they had paid a high price
both personally and professionally as a result. The Study affirmed the notion that gender schemas and accumulated disadvantage, but not necessarily intentional action, constituted
discrimination.
The MIT Study could have been the report of the October
1999 AALS Workshop on Women in Legal Education. Although
numbers of women in the legal academy have increased, the
Workshop revealed tremendous feelings of marginalization by
many women, exclusion from positions of power within their
institutions. Many women are in the new "female ghettos" of
legal writing and clinical teaching; and so they are in lower
status positions and do more labor-intensive work." Many
women do institutional "caretaking" work: advising and
mentoring students, developing student-focused programs,
participating on committees, laboring for love within the institution. Their work is, like caretaking work in the home, frequently invisible.12 Many senior women spoke about particular forms of marginalization, such as exclusion from membership on, or leadership of, powerful committees and failure of
their home institutions to recognize their accomplishments,
and the statistics bear them out. Fewer women have chairs or
are directors of centers or institutes. Many cannot negotiate
higher salaries or positions if they are forced to "leverage"
these matters with outside offers, since they are more frequently locked in geographically by family or caretaking needs.
Backlash and resistance of other faculty members and students
are also significant.
Yet issues of gender are also increasingly less visible in
the legal academy. Ann Douglas, Professor of English at Columbia University, recently wrote an article in the online mag-

" See Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in
Legal Writing Programs, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 117 (1997); Pamela Edwards, Teaching
Legal Writing as Women's Work: Life on the Fringes of the Academy, 4 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 75 (1997); Robert F. Seibel, Symposium: Institutional Barriers to
Women in the Workplace: Do Deans Discriminate?:An Examination of Lower Salaries Paid to Women Clinical Teachers, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 541 (1996).
2 See Susan B. Apel, Gender and Invisible Work: Musings of a Woman Law
Professor, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 993 (1997).
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azine Salon on her experiences with gender discrimination in
Ivy League academia. 3 She observed that gender parity is no
longer seen as a pressing issue in the academy. She quotes
Jean E. Howard, an English professor at Columbia University
and currently the president of the Shakespeare Association of
America, to say, "Feminism is no longer foregrounded in progressive politics in the academy, especially in the elite institu4
tions. The assumption is, we've done that."' Howard was
5
quick to add, "We haven't-it's just not being talked about."
These are serious problems of cognition-cognition of what
bias, cognition by women ourselves, cognition by a
gender
is
society. Nancy Hopkins recounts that her awakening did not
come when she was discussing how much lower her salary was
than those of her male peers ("it was my fault," she remembers
thinking, "I'd never asked about salaries")-until a male col-6
teaching.
league in effect took over a course she had been
Marianne LaFrance identifies this phenomenon as the modus
operandi of women's subjugation. 7 We look at individual instances and do not (or refuse to) see the accumulated results of
so many small, unacknowledged harms that constitute patterns of differential treatment and exclusion. But I want to
underscore Marianne LaFrance's point that it is important to
see the problems of gender bias as resulting from power differ8
ential and male privilege, not just cognition. The story of
MIT and the story for women in the legal academy is about the
power of denial and the denial of power-about not being willing to see systemic problems but thinking it is "just us."
On the positive side, the MIT study and the AALS Workshop underscore the continuing importance of cognition-shared
cognition-that old idea of "consciousness-raising'--the significance of women beginning to talk and share stories-not saying
"you're crazy," but "me too!" Without women making these
cognitive connections, we would never have had the Women's
Movement activism that has led to legal recognition of the

" See Douglas, supra note 5.
14 Id.

15 Id.
16

Id.

17

See Marianne LaFrance, The Schemas and Schemes in Sex Discrimination,

65 BROOK. L. REV. 1063 (1999).

"' See id.
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harms of sexual harassment and domestic violence, which we
now take for granted. 9 Legal recognition resulted from the
accumulation of many "me toos," and the re-cognition that
small, seemingly trivial acts of private harm were public
violations.
Without cognition there is no legal change. But law does
not often acknowledge the subtlety of cognition. Thus, it is
important to note the contrast between Professor Valian's
complex, multi-faceted description of how discrimination happens in real life and the arcane and formalistic notion of discrimination that the Supreme Court has detailed. For example,
in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney," Massachusetts had passed legislation to provide an absolute
veteran's preference for civil service jobs. Of course, women
were not veterans, so women were excluded from these automatic preferences, which meant a lot in terms of their access to
good jobs in the real world. The veteran's preference was challenged by a woman on equal protection grounds, and the Supreme Court concluded there was no violation because in order
to show there was discrimination one had to prove "discriminatory purpose" and clear intent to discriminate. The Supreme
Court explained:
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely
"in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Yet,
nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans
was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would
accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and
predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service.2

Professor Valian's work, the MIT story, and the AALS Workshop suggest the inappropriateness of the Feeney standard,
and the importance of integrating more complex insights of
cognition into lawmaking.

19

tic

For further discussion of these issues in the context of lawmaking on domessee ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST

'violence,

LAWMAKING (forthcoming 2000).
20 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
21 Id. at 279 (citation omitted).
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Now, cognition is the first step, but remedying the simply
cognitive dimension is not enough. Professor Valian recognizes
this in the last part of her book where she discusses remedies:
she observes that sensitivity training is a limited remedy because people do not need to simply disclose and share unconscious biases. Instead, she notes that "[tihey need only understand that they are likely to have such biases, and that they
must work out procedures to protect themselves and others
22
from bad judgments based on them." But how will people begin to understand that those judgments are "bad"? Recognition
of the structural and power imbalances within institutions that
reinforce these biases, and the development of procedures to
identify bias and to protect against bad judgment, are the next
steps. What the MIT Study and the AALS Workshop tell us is
that women acting collectively to recognize systemic patterns
behind small and trivial exclusions, and thoughtful, open and
responsive institutional leadership, are necessary, even if not
sufficient, prerequisites for change.

22 VALIAN, supra note 1, at 315.

